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We study the scale and nature of ability peer effects in secondary schools in England. In order to shed
light on the nature of these effects, we investigate which segments of the peer ability distribution drive
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pupil ability distribution are affected by different measures of peer quality. To do so, we use census
data for four cohorts of pupils taking their age-14 national tests in 2003/2004-2006/2007, and measure
students’ ability by their prior achievements at age-11. We base our identification strategy on within-pupil
regressions that exploit variation in achievements across the three compulsory subjects (English, Mathematics
and Science) tested both at age-14 and age-11. We find significant and sizeable negative peer effects
arising from students at the very bottom of the ability distribution, but little evidence that the average
peer quality and the very top peers significantly affect pupils’ academic achievements. However, these
results mask some significant heterogeneity along the gender dimension, with girls significantly benefiting
from the presence of very academically bright peers, and boys significantly losing out. We further
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1. Introduction 
The estimation of peer effects in the classroom and at school has received intense attention in recent 
years. Several studies have presented convincing evidence about race, gender and immigrants’ peer 
effects1, but important questions about the scale and nature (i.e. the ‘origins’) of ability peer effects in 
schools remain open, with little conclusive evidence.2 In this paper we study ability peer effects in 
educational outcomes between schoolmates in secondary schools in England. Our aims are both to 
investigate the size (i.e. the ‘scale’) of ability peer effects on the outcomes of secondary school 
students, and to explore which segments of the ability distribution of peers drive the impact of peer 
quality on pupils’ achievements (i.e. the ‘nature’). In particular, we study whether the extreme tails of 
the ability distribution of peers – namely the exceptionally low- and high-achievers – as opposed to the 
average peer quality drive any significant peer effect on the outcomes of other students. 
To do so, we use data for all secondary schools in England for four cohorts of age-14 (9th grade) 
pupils entering secondary school in the academic years 2001/2002 to 2004/2005 and taking their age-
14 national tests in 2003/2004-2006/2007. We link this information to data on pupils’ prior 
achievement at age-11, when they took their end-of-primary education national tests, which we exploit 
to obtain pre-determined proxy measures of peer ability in secondary schools. In particular, we 
construct measures of average peer quality based on pupils’ age-11 achievements, as well as proxies 
for the very high- and very low-achievers, obtained by identifying pupils who are in the highest or 
lowest 5% of the (cohort-specific) national distribution of cognitive achievement at age-11. The way 
in which we measure peer ability is a major improvement over previous studies. The vast majority of 
previous empirical evidence on ability peer effects in schools arises from studies that examine the 
effect of average background characteristics, such as parental schooling, race and ethnicity on 
students’ outcomes (e.g. Hoxby, 2000 for the US and Ammermueller and Pischke, 2009 for several 
European countries). A limitation of these studies is that they do not directly measure the academic 
ability of students’ peers, but rely on socio-economic background characteristics as proxies for this. 
Additionally, our measures of peer quality are immune to refection problems (Manski, 1993) for two 
reasons. First, we identify peers’ quality based on pupils’ test scores at the end of primary education, 
before students change school and move on to the secondary phase. As a consequence of the large 
reshuffling of pupils in England during this transition, on average secondary school students meet 87% 
new peers at secondary schools, i.e. students that do not come from the same primary. Secondly and 
crucially, we are able to track pupils during this transition, which means that we can single out new 
peers from old peers, and construct peer quality measures separately for these two groups. In our 
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 Recent examples include Angrist and Lang (2004) on peer effects through racial integration; Hoxby (2000) and 
Lavy and Schlosser (2007) on gender peer effect; and Gould, Lavy and Paserman (2009a) on the effect of 
immigrants on native students. 
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 One exception is Sacerdote (2001), who presents evidence on ability peer effects in college based on co-
residence of randomly paired roommates in university housing. 
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analysis, we focus on the effect of new peers’ ability on pupil achievement (controlling for old peers’ 
quality), thus by-passing reflection problems.3  
Our results show that a large fraction of ‘bad’ peers at school as identified by students in the 
bottom 5% of the ability distribution negatively and significantly affect the cognitive performance of 
other schoolmates. Importantly, we find that it is only the very bottom 5% students that (negatively) 
matter, and not ‘bad’ peers in other parts of the ability distribution. On the other hand, we uncover 
little evidence that the average peer quality and the share of very ‘good’ peers as identified by students 
in the top 5% of the ability distribution affect the educational outcomes of other pupils. However, 
these findings mask a significant degree of heterogeneity along the gender dimension. Indeed, we 
show that girls significantly benefit from interactions with very bright peers, and the more so if they 
are in the bottom half of the ability distribution. In marked contrast, boys are negatively affected by a 
larger proportion of academically outstanding peers at school, with this adverse effect being more 
evident for male students in the top part of the ability distribution. On the other hand, we find that the 
negative effect of the very weak students does not significantly vary by the ability of regular students, 
nor along the gender dimension. Finally, the effect of the average peer quality on pupil cognitive 
achievement is estimated to be zero for boys and girls, and for students of different abilities.  
Besides providing some novel insights about the nature of ability peer effects, our paper presents 
a new identification approach that allows us to improve on the (non-experimental) literature4 in the 
field and to identify the effects of peers’ ability while avoiding biases due to endogenous selection and 
sorting of pupils, or omitted variables issues. Indeed, the distribution of pupils’ characteristics in 
secondary schools in England, like in many other countries, reflects a high degree of sorting and 
selection by ability. For example, using pupils’ age-11 nationally standardized test scores as an 
indicator of ability we find that the average ability of peers and pupil’s own ability in secondary 
school are highly correlated. This is so despite the fact that most students change school when moving 
from primary to secondary education and that on average pupils meet 87% new peers. Similarly, there 
is a high correlation between pupils’ and their peers’ socioeconomic background characteristics, which 
is further evidence that students are not randomly assigned to secondary schools and that the very top 
and very low achievers are typically clustered in high- and low-achieving schools. More surprisingly, 
these correlations survive even when we look at the within-secondary-school variation over time of 
pupils’ and their peers’ ability (i.e. conditional on secondary school fixed-effects)5. This suggests that 
some sorting/selection might be taking place, with pupils and schools being affected by and/or 
responding to cohort-specific unobserved shocks to students’ and schools’ quality. Identification 
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 Note that this does not imply that we are able to separate endogenous from exogenous peer effects (see Manksi, 
1993). We see this as a further and separate issue from reflection problems that arise from previous or 
simultaneous interactions among students that affect measures of peers’ ability (see Sacerdote, 2001). 
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 A number of recent studies have used explicit random or quasi-random assignment to classes or schools, or 
other natural experiments, for example, Sacerdote (2001), Zimmerman (2003), Angrist and Lang (2004), 
Arcidiacono and Nicholson (2005), Hanushek et al. (2003) and Gould, Lavy and Paserman (2009b). 
5
 A similar result is documented by Gibbons and Telhaj (2008) and Black et al. (2009). 
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strategies that rely on the randomness of peers’ quality variation within-schools over time find little 
justification against this background. 
In order to overcome this selection problem, we rely on within-pupil regressions (i.e. 
specifications including pupil fixed-effects) that exploit variation in achievements across the three 
compulsory subjects (English, Mathematics and Science) tested at age-14. We further exploit the fact 
that students were tested on the same three subjects at age-11 (at the end of primary schools), so that 
we can measure peers’ ability separately by subject. We then study whether subject-to-subject 
variation in outcomes for the same student is systematically associated with the subject-to-subject 
variation in peers’ ability.  
One significant advantage of this approach is that by including pupil fixed-effects we are able to 
control for pupil own unobservable average ability across the three subjects, as well as for unmeasured 
family background characteristics. Additionally, we can partial out in a non-parametric way school-
by-cohort fixed-effects and other more general cohort-specific unobserved shocks that might affect 
pupils’ outcomes and peers’ quality similarly across the three subjects. This seems particularly 
important given the evidence of year-on-year secondary school sorting highlighted here above. On the 
other hand, one potential threat to our identification strategy is the possibility that sorting occurs along 
the lines of subject-specific abilities, so that within-student across-subject variation in ability is 
correlated with the variation in peers’ ability across subjects. However, as we shall see below, 
conditional on pupil fixed-effects, our results are virtually identical irrespective of whether or not we 
control for pupils’ age-11 test scores, a proxy for students’ subject-specific prior academic ability. 
This is because there is neither a sizeable nor a significant correlation between the within-student 
across-subject variation in age-11 achievements, and the variation in peers’ ability across subjects. 
This suggests that specifications that include pupil fixed-effects effectively take care of most of the 
sorting of pupils and their peers into secondary education, and provide reliable causal estimates of 
ability peer effects. To further support this claim, we provide an extensive battery of robustness checks 
and falsification exercises that lend additional credibility to the causal interpretation of our results.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the recent literature on 
peer effects, while Section 3 describes the identification strategy. Section 4 describes the institutional 
background and our dataset. Section 5 reports our main estimates and robustness checks, while Section 
6 presents some heterogeneity in our findings. Finally, Section 7 provides some concluding remarks. 
2. Related literature 
For a long time social scientists have been interested in understanding and measuring the effects of 
peers’ behavior and characteristics on individual outcomes, both empirically (e.g. Coleman, 1966) and 
theoretically (e.g. Becker, 1974). The basic idea is that group actions or attributes might influence 
individual decisions and outcomes, such as educational attainment. Despite its intuitiveness, the 
estimation of peer effects is fraught with difficulties and many of the related identification issues have 
yet to find a definitive answer. In particular, Manski (1993) highlights the perils of endogenous group 
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selection and the difficulty of distinguishing between contextual and endogenous peer effects. In 
practice, most studies have ignored this distinction and focused on reduced form estimation as outlined 
by Moffit (2001), where peer group characteristics are used to explain differences in individual 
outcomes. Even then, the literature has had to by-pass a variety of biases that arise because of 
endogenous sorting or omitted variables and has not yet reached a consensus regarding the size and 
importance even of these reduced form effects.  
In particular, two main issues have taxed researchers interested in the identification of the causal 
effect of peer quality in education. Firstly, it is widely recognized that a pupil’s peer group is evidently 
self-selected and hence the quality of peers is not exogenous to pupil’s own quality and 
characteristics.6 Failing to control for all observable and unobservable factors that determine 
individual sorting and achievements would result in biased estimates of ability peer effects. Secondly, 
peer effects work in both directions, so that peer achievements are endogenous to one pupils’ own 
quality if students have been together for a while. This mechanical issue, known as the ‘reflection 
problem’, is particularly difficult to undo unless the researcher is able to reshuffle group formation and 
belonging and measure peers’ quality in ways that are predetermined to interactions within the group. 
To account for these difficulties, recent years have seen a variety of identification strategies. 
Different studies have exploited random group assignments (Sacerdote, 2001; Zimmerman, 2003; 
Duflo et al., 2008; De Giorgi et al., 2009, Gould et al., 2009b), within-school random variation 
(Hoxby, 2000; Hanushek et al., 2003; Ammermualler and Pischke, 2009, Gould et al, 2009a), 
instrumental variables (Goux and Maurin, 2007) or sub-group re-assignments (Katz et al., 2001 and 
Sanbonmatsu et al., 2006).7 Only recently, Lavy and Schlosser (2007), Lavy et al. (2008) and Duflo et 
al. (2008) have tried to enter the ‘black box’ of ability peer effects in Israel and Kenya, respectively, 
and have explicitly focused on understanding the mechanisms through which interactions could exert 
their effects. Duflo et al. (2008) exploits random assignment of pupils in primary schools in Kenya to 
classes by ability in order to identify peer effects. The authors find improvements from ability-tracking 
in primary schools and attribute this result to the fact that more homogeneous groups of students might 
be taught more effectively. Lavy et al. (2008) present related evidence of significant and negative 
effect of a high fraction of low ability students in the class (repeaters) on the outcomes of other pupils, 
which might arise through classroom disruption and decrease in attention paid by the teacher.  
The study that is closest to ours in terms of context and data is Gibbons and Telhaj (2008) who 
also estimate peer effects for pupils in English secondary schools. The authors attempt to control for 
the endogenous sorting of pupils to secondary schools by allowing for primary and secondary school 
fixed-effect interactions and trends. However, this approach does not fully eliminate the correlation 
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 There is a well established literature on the link between school quality and house prices (Black, 1999, Gibbons 
et al., 2009 and Kane et al., 2006), suggesting that pupils are segregated into different neighborhoods and 
schools by socio-economic status. 
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 Other examples include: Aizer (2008), Bifulco et al. (2008), Burke and Sass (2008), Carrell and Hoekstra 
(2008), Figlio (2007), Lefgren (2004), Nechyba and Vidgor (2007) and Vidgor and Nechyba (2004). 
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between pupils’ own ability and peer quality, and their results provide little evidence of sizeable and 
significant peer effects.  
To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first one to rely on pupil fixed-effects and inter-
subject differences in achievement to address identification issues of peer effects in schools.8 As 
already mentioned, this allows to control for pupil unobservable average ability, unmeasured family 
background characteristics, school-by-cohort fixed effects and other more general cohort-specific 
shocks that are common to the three subjects. We believe this approach helps us to achieve a clean 
identification of the causal effect of peers’ ability. In the next section we spell out in more details our 
empirical strategy. 
3. Empirical strategy 
3.1. General identification strategy: within-pupil regressions 
The main problem with identifying the effect of the ability composition of peers on pupil educational 
achievements is that peer quality measures are usually confounded by the effects of unobserved 
correlated factors that affect students’ outcomes. This correlation could arise if there is selection and 
sorting of students across schools based on ability differences, or if there is a relation between average 
students’ ability in one school and other characteristics of that school (not fully observed) that might 
affect students’ outcomes. The approach commonly used in several recent studies relies on within-
school variations in the ability distribution of students across adjacent cohorts or across different 
classes (e.g. Ammermualler and Pischke, 2009; Hoxby, 2000; Gibbons and Telhaj, 2008; Gould et al., 
2009a; Lavy et al., 2008; and Lavy and Schlosser, 2007). This method potentially avoids both sources 
of confounding factors, although the identifying assumption is that the variation of peer quality over 
time (or across classes) is purely idiosyncratic and uncorrelated with students’ potential outcomes and 
background.  
In this paper, we suggest an alternative approach for overcoming the potential selection/sorting 
and omitted variable biases, namely we examine subject-to-subject variation in outcomes for the same 
student and investigate if this is systematically associated with the subject-to-subject variation in 
peers’ ability. The ability peer effects that we study here are therefore subject-specific. Stated 
differently, in this paper we question whether pupils who have school peers that have on average 
higher ability in subject j (e.g. Mathematics) than in subject i (e.g. Science), have better cognitive 
performance in subject j than in subject i.  
More formally, using test scores in multiple subjects and four cohorts of 9th graders taking their 
age-14 national tests in the academic years 2003/2004-2006/2007, we estimate the following pupil 
fixed-effect equation: 
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 Lavy (2009) uses the same approach to investigate the effect of instructional time on academic achievements, 
while Bandiera et al. (2009) use within-student across-subjects variation to study class size effects at university 
and Bandiera et al. (forthcoming) exploit within-worker over-time variation to analyse social incentives at work. 
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Where i denotes pupils, q denotes subjects (English, Mathematics and Science), s denotes schools and 
t denotes pupils’ cohort. iqstA is an achievement measure for student i in subject q at school s in cohort 
t. In our analysis, we focus on test scores in the three compulsory subjects (English, Mathematics and 
Science) assessed at age-14 during the national tests; these are denoted in England as Key Stage 3 
(KS3; more details are presented in Section 4). Additionally, iα  is a student fixed effect, qβ  is a 
subject specific effect, and
stγ  is a school × cohort effect. We also include an interaction term between 
pupil’s gender and subject specific effects which is meant to control for the well-documented gender 
disparities in achievements in different subjects (see Ellison and Swanson, 2009 and Fryer and Levitt, 
forthcoming), and the effect that these might have on pupils’ and their peers’ sorting into secondary 
schooling.9 Next, qstP  captures the average ability of peers in subject q in secondary school s in cohort 
t as measured by test scores in a given subject in the national tests taken by students at age-11 at the 
end of primary school (denoted as Key Stage 2, or KS2). On the other hand, hqsP  and lqsP  capture the 
fraction of very high-ability and the very low-ability peers in one students’ cohort. More precisely, we 
choose the top and bottom 5% in the (cohort-specific) national distribution of KS2 test scores as the 
cut off points to determine hqsP  and 
l
qsP  (more details in the data section). Finally, iqstε  is an error 
term, which is composed of a pupil-specific random element that allows for any type of correlation 
within observations of the same student and of the same school.  
The coefficients of interest are 1δ , which captures the effect of the average ability of peers on 
students’ achievement; 2δ , which measures the effect of the proportion of peers in the cohort who are 
in the top 5% of the national distribution of KS2 test scores; and 3δ , which identifies the effect of the 
fraction of students who are in the bottom 5%. As discussed above, we are interested in the relative 
strength and significance of these three coefficients to determine which segments of the peer ability 
distribution drive any ability peer effect that we will document. 
Note that one significant advantage of this approach is that pupil fixed-effects ‘absorb’ students’ 
own unobservable average ability across subjects as well as unmeasured family background 
characteristics. Moreover, this specification allows to partial out in a fully non-parametric way school-
by-cohort fixed effects (e.g. unobserved changes in school resources or head teacher), and other more 
general cohort-specific unobserved shocks (e.g. changes in the quality of primary schooling or in the 
quality of childcare facilities) that might affect pupils’ outcomes and peers’ quality similarly across the 
three subjects. This seems particularly important given the issues discussed in Arcidiacono et al. 
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 We also tried specifications where we interact other pupil characteristics (e.g. eligibility for free school meals) 
with subject specific dummies, and found virtually identical results. However, we prefer the more parsimonious 
specification in Equation (1). 
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(2009) and given that, as highlighted in the Introduction, we find evidence of a significant correlation 
between pupils’ characteristics and ability and the characteristics and ability of their peers even 
conditional on secondary school fixed-effects. This suggests that some form of parental sorting based 
on school-by-year specific considerations might be taking place, or that cohort-specific shocks to pupil 
and school quality might have occurred. 
Before moving on, three remarks are worth being made. First, one necessary assumption for our 
identification strategy is that peer effects are the same for all three subjects; stated differently, we 
cannot interact the δ parameters with qβ  in Equation (1). Although this restriction does not seem 
untenable, in the analysis that follows we will provide some evidence to support this conjecture. 
Second, our peer effects are ‘net’ measures of peer influences, that is net of ability spillovers across 
subjects (e.g. peers’ ability in English might influence pupils’ test scores in Mathematics). If spillovers 
are very strong such that subject-specific abilities do not matter, then we are bound to find zero peer 
effects. Third, results are unchanged when we use the absolute number of very weak and very good 
peers instead of their proportion.   
3.2. Dealing with potential threats to identification 
Although the strategy described so far allows us to effectively control for pupils’ average ability 
across subjects, unobservable family background characteristics and school-by-cohort unobservable 
shocks, this setup does not preclude the possibility that selection and sorting of students in different 
schools is partly based on subject-specific ability and considerations. In particular, there might be 
some residual correlation between the within-student across-subject variation in age-11 prior 
achievements, capturing students’ subject-specific abilities, and the variation in peers’ quality across 
subjects.  
Our main approach to account for such potential sorting is to control for pupils’ KS2 test scores 
in all subjects in the within-pupil estimation. The underlying assumption is that the lagged test scores 
effectively capture any subject-specific abilities, and therefore within-subject peer assignment is as 
good as random conditional on primary school test scores. Stated differently, there is no sorting based 
on other unobserved factors that are not correlated with KS2 scores. To our advantage, we can control 
for lagged test scores in a very flexible way by including in our specification at the same time same-
subject lagged test scores (e.g. looking at KS3 English test score for pupil i controlling for his/her age-
11 English achievement), as well as cross-subject test scores (e.g. looking at pupil i’s age-14 English 
test score controlling for his/her age-11 attainments in Mathematics). This allows us to partial out the 
effect of one pupil’s own ability in a specific subject, as well as his or her ‘spread’ of ability across the 
three core-subjects and any cross-subject effects. Additionally, we can interact lagged test scores with 
subject-specific dummies, so that age-11 achievements can exhibit different effects on age-14 
outcomes in different subjects. Under our most flexible (and preferred) specification, we estimate the 
following model: 
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where now iqsta  represents same-subject lagged test scores, stiqa )1(−  and stiqa )2(− are the two cross-
subjects lagged test scores, and qλ , qθ  and qκ  are subject-specific parameters that capture the effects 
of lagged test scores in the same- and cross-subjects.10 Anticipating our findings below, we find that 
results from within-pupil specifications are virtually unaffected by whether or not we control for 
pupils’ age-11 test scores. This is because there is neither a sizeable nor a significant correlation 
between the within-student across-subject variation in prior achievements, and the variation in peers’ 
ability across subjects. Stated differently, conditional on pupil fixed-effects, peers’ subject-specific 
quality measures are almost perfectly balanced with respect to pupils’ own age-11 test scores, and 
specifications that include pupil fixed-effects effectively take care of the sorting of pupils and their 
peers into secondary education.  
We further complement our core strategy with a set of robustness checks and alternative 
specifications that allow us to gauge the importance of subject-specific school selection and pupil 
sorting. For example, we include in some of our specifications school-by-subject fixed-effects to 
control for the sorting of pupils and their peers into schools based on subject-specific school 
unobservables. All these exercises provide strong support to the causal interpretation of our estimates. 
3.3. Measuring peers’ ability 
A key requirement for our empirical approach is that the proxies of peer ability are based on pre-
determined measures of students’ ability that have not been affected by the quality of his/her peers and 
thus do not suffer from reflection problems. As already discussed, the longitudinal structure of the 
administrative data that we use allows us to link peers’ KS2 test scores taken at the end of primary 
school (6th grade) to students’ KS3 achievements three years later, that is 9th grade in secondary 
school. Additionally, by following individuals over time, we are able to point out which secondary 
school students come from the same primary and identify who the new peers and the old peers are. On 
average, about 87% of pupil i’s peers in secondary school did not attend the same primary institution 
as student i, and therefore their KS2 test scores could not have been affected by this pupil. In our 
analysis, we construct peer quality measures separately for new peers and old peers, and focus on the 
effect of the former on pupil achievement to avoid reflection problems. Note also that in most of our 
empirical work we include measures of the quality of old peers as additional controls. These help us to 
control for primary-school × cohort × subject effects that might persist on age-14 test scores and that 
are shared by pupils coming from the same primary school and cohort. Note however that our 
estimates are not sensitive to the inclusion of these variables. 
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Two final remarks are worth being made. First, we use information about the school that a pupil 
is attending at age-12 (7th grade), when he/she enters secondary education, to define our base 
population. Similarly our three measures of peer quality ‘treatment’ (the good, the bad and the average 
peer quality) are based on 7th-grade enrollment. This is because any later definition of these proxies, 
for example as recorded at KS3, might be endogenous. Second, in implementing this methodology, we 
use peers’ ability measured at the grade and not at the class level because our data does not include 
class identifiers, and because class placement might be endogenous since school authorities may have 
some discretion in placing students in different classes within a grade. However, we do not see this as 
a restrictive compromise since the majority of schools do not group pupils with different subject-
specific abilities in different classes at the early stages of secondary education (see more details in the 
next section). Therefore, the quality of peers within a grade is likely to be strongly correlated with the 
quality of peers within classes. On the other hand, if some degree of subject-specific streaming takes 
place so that our peer quality measures capture the peer quality actually experienced by pupils with 
some noise, our estimates will be downward biased and more properly interpreted as ‘intention-to-
treat’ peer effects.11 
4. Institutions, data and descriptive statistics 
4.1.  Schooling in England: institutional background 
Compulsory education in England is organized into five stages referred to as Key Stages. In the 
primary phase, pupils enter school at age 4-5 in the Foundation Stage, then move on to Key Stage 1 
(KS1), spanning ages 5-6 and 6-7 (these would correspond to the 1st and 2nd grade in other educational 
system, e.g. in the US). At age 7-8 pupils move to KS2, sometimes – but not usually – with a change 
of school. At the end of KS2, when they are 10-11 (6th grade), children leave the primary phase and go 
on to secondary school where they progress through KS3 (7th to 9th grade) and KS4 (10th to 12th grade). 
Importantly, the vast majority of pupils changes schools on transition from primary to secondary 
education, and move on to the school of their choice. 
Indeed, since the Education Reform Act of 1988, the ‘choice model’ of school provision has been 
progressively extended in the state-school system in England (Glennerster, 1991). In this setting, 
pupils can attend any under-subscribed school regardless of where they live and parental preference is 
the deciding factor. All Local Education Authorities (LEAs) and schools must organize their 
admissions arrangements in accordance with the current statutory Governmental Admissions Code of 
Practice. The guiding principle of this document is that parental choice should be the first 
consideration when ranking applications to schools. However, if the number of applicants exceeds the 
number of available places, other criteria which are not discriminatory, do not involve selection by 
ability and can be clearly assessed by parents, can be used to prioritize applicants. These vary in detail, 
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but preference is usually given first to children with special educational needs, next to children with 
siblings in the school and to those children who live closest. For Faith schools, regular attendance at 
local designated churches or other expressions of religious commitment is foremost. As a result, 
although choice is the guiding principle that schools should use to rank pupils’ applications, it has long 
been suspected that they have some leeway to pursue some forms of covert selection based on parental 
and pupil characteristics that are correlated with pupil ability (see West and Hind, 2003). 
As for testing, at the end of each Key Stage, generally in May, pupils are assessed on the basis of 
standard national tests (SATS) and progress through the phases is measured in terms of Key Stage 
Levels, ranging between W (working towards Level 1) up to Level 5+ during primary education and 
Level 7 at KS3. Importantly for our research, at both KS2 (6th grade) and KS3 (9th grade) students are 
tested in three core subjects, namely Mathematics, Science and English, and their attainments are 
recorded in terms of the raw test scores, spanning the range 0-100, from which the Key Stage Levels 
are derived. We will use these test scores to measure pupils’ attainments at KS3 and identify the 
quality of their peers as measured by their KS2. 
Finally, regarding the organization of teaching and class formation, two important issues are 
worth mentioning. First, the concept of ‘class’ is a rather hollow one in English secondary schools 
since students tend to be grouped with different pupils for different subjects. A second important 
aspect that characterizes English secondary education is the practice of ‘ability setting’, i.e. subject-
specific streaming. Under these arrangements, secondary school pupils are initially taught in mixed-
ability groups for an observation and acclimatization period of around a year, and then eventually 
educated in different groups for different subjects according to their aptitude in that specific topic. 
Subject-specific ability is often gauged using end-of-primary education (KS2) test scores; these are 
only available to schools several months after they have admitted pupils. However, teachers and 
school staff have some discretion in determining the ability set that is most appropriate for their 
students in different subjects (see DfES, 2006; Kutnick et al., 2006). Note that despite some explicit 
support from the Government, the practice of ability setting has not been fully adopted by secondary 
schools in England. Kutnick et al. (2005) reports that about 80% of secondary schools have ability sets 
for Mathematics at some point between 7th grade and 9th grade, but only 53% from grade 7. These 
figures are much lower for English and Science respectively at: 46% (at some stage between 7th and 9th 
grade) and 34% (from 7th grade); and 59% (sometimes between 7th and 9th grade) and 44% (from 7th 
grade). In conclusion, two important features emerge from this brief discussion. First, because of the 
lack of clearly defined and stable classes during secondary education, students will predominantly 
interact with different peers in different subjects. Second, since ability setting is not strictly 
implemented, pupils will face a variety of class-mates with a heterogeneous range of abilities during 
instruction time even for the same subject. 
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4.2. Data construction 
The UK’s Department for Children, Schools and Families (DCSF) collects a variety of data on all 
pupils and all schools in state education12. This is because the pupil assessment system is used to 
publish school performance tables and because information on pupil numbers and pupil/school 
characteristics is necessary for administrative purposes – in particular to determine funding. Starting 
from 1996, a database exists holding information on each pupil’s assessment record in the Key Stage 
SATS described above throughout their school career. Additionally, starting from 2002, the DCSF has 
also carried out the Pupil Level Annual School Census (PLASC), which records information on 
pupil’s gender, age, ethnicity, language skills, any special educational needs or disabilities, entitlement 
to free school meals and various other pieces of information, including the identity of the school 
attended during years other than those when pupils sit for their Key Stage tests. The PLASC is 
integrated with the pupil’s assessment records in the National Pupil Database (NPD), giving a large 
and detailed dataset on pupil characteristics, along with their test histories. Furthermore, various other 
data sources can be merged in at school level using the DCSF Edubase and Annual School Census, 
which contain details on school institutional characteristics (e.g. religious affiliation), demographics of 
the enrolled students (e.g. fractions of pupils eligible for free school meals) and size (e.g. number of 
pupils on roll). 
The length of the time series in the data means that it is possible for us to follow the academic 
careers of four cohorts of children from age-11 (6th grade) through to age-14 (9th grade), and to join 
this information to the PLASC data for every year of secondary schooling (7th to 9th grade). The four 
cohorts that we use include pupils who finished primary education in the academic years 2000/2001 to 
2003/2004, entered secondary school in 2001/2002 to 2004/2005, and sat for their KS3 exams in 
2003/2004 to 2006/2007. We use information on these four cohorts as our core dataset because this is 
the only time window where we can identify the secondary school where pupils start their secondary 
education, and not only the one where they take their KS3 tests. As explained above, this is crucial to 
our analysis because we want to be able to measure peer exposure at the beginning of secondary 
schooling (in 7th grade), and not after two years (in 9th grade). The data also allows us to gather 
information about the primary school where pupils took the KS2 exams, which implies that we are 
able to single-out secondary schoolmates that are new peers from those who instead came from the 
same primary school (i.e. old peers).  
Using this set of information we construct a variety of peer quality measures based on pupil 
achievements at KS2 in the three core subjects. In order to do so, we use the KS2 test scores, 
separately by subject and cohort, to assign each pupil to a percentile in the cohort-specific and subject-
specific national distribution. We then go on to create three separate measures of peer quality. First, 
we compute the average attainments of peers in the grade at school. Next, we create two measures that 
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are meant to capture peer effects coming from very bright and very worst students at school, namely: 
the fraction of peers (in the grade at school) below the 5th percentile or above the 95th percentile of the 
cohort-specific national distribution of KS2 test scores. 
We have imposed a set of restrictions on our data in order to obtain a balanced panel of pupil 
information in a balanced panel of schools. First, we have selected only pupils with valid information 
on their KS2 and KS3 tests for whom we can also match individual background characteristics and the 
identity of the school where they start their secondary education using PLSAC. Given the quality of 
our data, this implies that we drop less than 2.5% of our initial data. Next, we have focused on schools 
that are open in every year of our analysis and have further dropped secondary schools that have a 
year-on-year change of entry-cohort size of more than 75% or enrolments below 15 pupils. While the 
former restriction excludes schools that were exposed to large shocks that might confound our 
analysis, the latter excludes schools that are either extremely small or had many missing observations. 
These restrictions imply that we loose less than 2.5% of our observations.13 Furthermore, we apply 
some restriction based on the fraction of bottom 5% and top 5% pupils, in order to exclude schools 
with particularly high or low shares of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ peers. In particular, we drop schools where 
the fractions of pupils below the 5th percentile or above the 95th percentile of the cohort-specific KS2 
national distribution exceeds 20%, and schools that do not have any variation over the four years in 
these fractions. This last restriction predominantly trims schools that have no students in either the top 
or bottom 5% of the ability distribution in any year in any subject and would not contribute to the 
identification of peer effects. The two combined restrictions imply that we drop an additional 10% of 
our sample. Since this seems a large share, we checked that our main results are not affected when we 
omit these restrictions. 
Our final dataset includes a balanced panel of approximately 1,300,000 pupils for whom we can 
observe complete information in terms of KS2 and KS3 test scores, individual and family background 
characteristics, and both primary and secondary school level information from age-11 to age-14. In the 
next section, we present some descriptive statistics for our core sample. 
4.3. Some descriptive statistics 
In Table 1 we present descriptive statistics for the main variables of interest for the sample of ‘regular’ 
students, defined as pupils with age-11 test scores in the three core subjects above the 5th percentile 
and below the 95th percentile of KS2 test score distribution (Column 1). The regression analysis that 
follows solely consider these pupils, which we sometimes refer to as ‘treated’ students. In the same 
table, we also presents descriptive statistics for pupils in either the top 5% or bottom 5% tails of the 
ability distribution, that is ‘good’ and ‘bad’ peers (which we also label as ‘treatments’). 
In the top panel of the Table we describe pupils’ test scores at KS2 and KS3. Unsurprisingly, the 
first column shows that for regular students test score percentiles are centered just below 50, for all 
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subjects and at both Key Stages. The correlations of pupils’ KS2 test scores across subjects are 0.60 
for English and Mathematics; 0.63 for English and Science; and 0.68 for Science and Mathematics. At 
KS3 these correlations increase to 0.64, 0.68 and 0.80, respectively. Appendix Table 1 further shows 
that the within-pupil variations of the KS2 and KS3 test scores across the three subjects are 
respectively 11.9 and 11.2. Overall, this provides evidence that test scores are not perfectly correlated 
across subjects for the same student, although they tend to be more closely associated in Science and 
Mathematics, in particular at KS3. 
The remaining two columns of the table illustrate how pupils with at least one subject in either 
the top 5% or the bottom 5% of the ability distributions score at their KS2 and KS3 tests. By 
construction, pupils in top 5% of the KS2 test score distribution perform much better than any other 
pupil in their KS2 exams, while the opposite is true for pupils in the bottom 5% tail. We get a very 
similar picture if we look at pupils’ KS2 test scores in one subject (e.g. English) imposing that at least 
one of the other two subjects (e.g. Mathematics or Science) is above the 95th percentile or below the 5th 
percentile of the test score distribution.14 More interestingly, this stark ranking is not changed when we 
look at KS3 test scores, for all subjects, with little evidence of significant mean reversion in the 
achievements of very good and very bad peers between age-11 and age-14. To further substantiate this 
point, we have thoroughly analyzed the KS3 percentile ranking of pupils in the top 5% and bottom 5% 
of the KS2 achievement distribution. For all subjects, about 80% of the pupils ranking in the bottom 
5% at KS2, still rank in the bottom 20% of the KS3 distribution, with approximately 70% of them 
concentrated in the bottom 10%. At the opposite extreme, around 80% of pupils ranking in the top 5% 
at KS2 remains in the top 20% of the KS3 achievement distribution, with the vast majority still scoring 
in the top 10%. This reinforces the idea that our ‘good’ and ‘bad’ peers are consistently amongst the 
brightest and worst performers. 
The second panel of Table 1 presents more information on pupil background characteristics. The 
figures in the first column reveal that our sample is fully representative of the population of secondary 
school pupils in England. On the other hand, pupils with at least one subject in the bottom 5% are less 
likely to have English as their first language and to be of White British ethnic origins, and more likely 
to be eligible for free school meals (a proxy for family income). The opposite is true for pupils with at 
least on subject in the top 5%. However, the differences in family background are much less evident 
than those in terms of academic ability presented in Panel A. Peer ability measures defined in terms of 
pupil background would therefore severely underestimate differences in peers’ academic quality. 
Finally, in Panel C we report school characteristics for the various sub-groups. The average 
cohort size at the start of secondary school in 7th grade is approximately 200, and around two thirds of 
all pupils attend Community schools, while about 16% of the pupils attend a religiously affiliated 
state-school. Pupils with at least one subject in the top 5% of the ability distribution are less likely to 
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attend a Community school, and more likely to be in a faith school, than pupils in the central part of 
the ability distribution and students with at least one subject in the bottom 5%. However, these 
differences are not remarkable. 
In Table 2, we present some descriptive statistics of our ‘treatments’. Statistics are presented for 
new peers only. Note once again that on average pupils face 87% new schoolmates, although the 
distribution of new peers is highly right-skewed, with many more pupils facing 100% new 
schoolmates than zero. Panel A summarizes the average peer quality, computed as the average KS2 
percentile rank of peers in a given subject (excluding the pupil under consideration). Unsurprisingly, 
this is centered on 50 for all subjects. Panel B and Panel C, instead, present descriptive statistics for 
our proxies for ‘good’ and ‘bad’ new peers. By construction, the fractions of top 5% and bottom 5% 
‘new peers’ in the incoming cohort are smaller than the corresponding fractions including all peers (at 
around 5% each in every subject). Note that all peer quality measures display quite a wide range of 
variation, although this mainly capture differences across schools. Nevertheless, Appendix Table 1 
shows that the same pupil faces considerably different fractions of academically bright and weak 
students across different subjects, as well as a significant amount of within-pupil across subject 
dispersion in average peer’s age-11 test scores. This is the variation that our pupil fixed-effect 
regressions exploit to identify the effect of peer quality. 
5. Results  
5.1.  Effects of peers’ ability: main results 
We begin the discussion of our results by presenting estimates of the impact of the peer quality on 
pupil outcomes at KS3 obtained using the full sample of pupils and controlling for potential subject-
specific sorting by including lagged test scores. Results are reported in Table 3. Columns (1) and (2) 
present OLS and within-pupil estimates of the effect of average peer quality. Next, Columns (3) and 
(4) present OLS and within-pupil estimates of the effect of the percentage of bottom 5% peers, while 
Columns (5) and (6) present estimates of the effect of the percentage of top 5% peers. The estimates 
presented in the four rows of the table come from a variety of specifications, which differ in the way 
they control for lagged test scores. In the first two rows, we report estimates unconditional on age-11 
achievements, while the third row presents estimates where we include pupils’ own KS2 attainment in 
the same subject in interaction with subject dummies. This allows pupils’ lagged outcomes to affect 
age-14 test scores differently in different subjects. Finally, in the last row, we include pupils’ own KS2 
test scores in the same-subject and cross-subject (as detailed in Section 3.2) in interaction with subject 
effects to control for pupils’ own subject-specific ability, as well as his/her ‘spread’ of abilities across 
subjects and cross-subject spillovers. Note also that the results in the first row are obtained from 
different regressions entering either the average quality of peers, or the fraction of top 5% and bottom 
5% peers in the grade. Results in the remaining three rows come from regressions that include all three 
treatments together. 
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Starting from the first two rows, OLS estimates in Columns (1) suggest high and positive partial 
correlation between average peer quality and students’ KS3 achievements. The estimated coefficient is 
approximately 0.36 when only the average peer quality is entered in the regression, and it drops to 
0.19 when the quality of top and bottom peers is further appended to the specification. This suggests 
that the tails of the ability distribution potentially capture most of the partial correlation between 
average peer ability and KS3 achievements.15 A similar picture emerges when looking at Columns (3) 
and (5), which display OLS estimates of the effect of top 5% and bottom 5% peers at schools: the 
estimated coefficient of good peers is large, between 0.75 and 0.33, while the estimated coefficient of 
bad peers is significantly negative and in the order of -0.6/-1.0.  
However, a markedly different picture emerges when looking at Columns (2), (4) and (6). These 
comes from specifications that include pupil fixed-effects as described by Equation (1) in Section 3.1, 
and rely on within-pupil variation in age-14 test scores and peer quality to identify ability peer effects. 
Column (2) shows that the positive impact of average peer quality completely disappears upon 
inclusion of pupil fixed-effects: this is now estimated to be around 0.02, and not statistically different 
from zero. Similarly, Column (6) shows that the within-pupil estimates of the effect of the most 
academically talented peers are small and not statistically different from zero. Only the effect of the 
bottom 5% peers remains sizeable and significantly negative after including pupil fixed-effects. As 
shown in Column (4), this is estimated to be -0.12 in the first row, and -0.09 in the second row, where 
all three treatments are included simultaneously. Focusing on the latter, this is approximately one sixth 
of the corresponding OLS estimate. Although one reason why within-pupil estimates of peer effects 
might be smaller than OLS is because they net out overall effects that might arise through cross-
subject interactions, this dramatic reduction is more likely due to the fact that within-pupil estimates 
control for pupil own unobserved average ability, unmeasured family background characteristics and 
school-by-cohort unobserved effects.  
Nevertheless, pupil fixed-effects estimates presented in the first two rows are unconditional of 
KS2 achievements, and thus potentially contaminated by subject-specific pupil sorting. Therefore, in 
the last two rows of Table 3, we go on to include lagged test scores as an attempt to control for any 
residual pupil subject-specific ability and sorting. Note again that the specification in the third row 
presents estimates from specifications where we include pupils’ own KS2 attainment in the same 
subject in interaction with subject dummies, while in the last row we include pupils’ own KS2 test 
scores in the same-subject and cross-subject in interaction with subject effects. This ‘control function 
approach’ follows the strategy described in Section 3.2. 
Comparing the second to the third and fourth rows, we find that OLS estimates of ability peer 
effects are now between 15% and 30% smaller than before. However, even when controlling for 
lagged test scores in the OLS specification in a very flexible way as in Row (4), we are unable to 
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reduce our estimate of the effect of peers’ quality to values close to the within-pupils estimate. This 
strongly speaks in favor of within-pupil regressions, which allow us to control non-parametrically for 
pupils’ unobservable average ability and school-by-cohort unobservable shocks. On the other hand, 
the within-pupil estimates are essentially unaffected by the inclusion of pupils’ age-11 test scores. The 
effects of the average peer quality and of the share of bright students remain small and insignificant. 
More interestingly, the effect of the bottom 5% peers only marginally drops to -0.091 (from -0.095), 
when we only include KS2 attainment in the same subject, and to -0.089, when we further include 
cross-subject lagged test scores.16 This finding is particularly reassuring especially considering that the 
same-subject lagged test score enters the within-pupil regressions with a large coefficient (of about 
0.354, for example, in the third row), and is highly significant (t-statistics in excess of 230). In fact, the 
reason why lagged test scores hardly affect within-pupil estimates of effect of the bottom 5% new 
peers is that there is neither a sizeable nor a significant correlation between the within-student across-
subject variation in age-11 achievements, and the variation in ‘bad’ peers’ ability across subjects. 
Stated differently, conditional on pupil fixed-effects, the fraction of bottom 5% peers in one subject is 
completely balanced with respect to pupils’ own age-11 test scores in that subject. To assess this more 
formally, we re-ran the regression in Equation (1) replacing age-14 with age-11 pupil test scores as the 
dependent variable. The coefficient on the fraction of bottom 5% peers was small at about -0.024 (with 
a standard error of 0.013), and not significant at conventional levels. On the other hand we found some 
degree of positive selection on the average peer quality, and some negative selection on the fraction of 
top 5%. This however does not substantially affect our results, which are steadfastly anchored at zero 
as soon as we include pupil fixed-effects. All in all, these results suggest that within-pupil 
specifications effectively take care of the endogenous sorting of pupils and their peers into secondary 
education, and that any residual subject-specific sorting is too small to confound out estimates. 
5.2  Robustness checks to potential threats to identification  
In this section, we present a set of robustness checks that further support the causal interpretation of 
our findings. Results from these exercises are presented in Table 4. Throughout the table, estimates 
come from within-pupil specifications that control for same- and cross-subject KS2 test scores 
interacted with subject specific dummies as described by Equation (2). Further details are provided in 
the note to the table. 
As discussed in Section 4, parental choice is the guiding principle that education authorities 
should adopt when ranking pupils’ application to schools. However, some forms of covert selection 
might still take place, based on pupil and family characteristics that are associated to students’ 
academic ability, overall or in a specific subject. Such case might arise for example for pupils 
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attending ‘specialist’ schools, i.e. schools with a stated ‘specialism’ in a given subject. This is because 
specialist schools are allowed to introduce admissions priority rules for up to 10% of their intake for 
pupils who demonstrate a particular aptitude in the subject of their expertise. In our sample, about 
8.5% of the students attend a specialist school. Some common areas of specialism include: language; 
mathematics and computing; science; technology; business and enterprise; and arts. In the first row of 
Table 4, we present estimates of the effects of the three measures of peers’ quality obtained excluding 
from the sample pupils in specialist schools. These within-pupil estimates are largely identical to those 
discussed in Table 3 for all peer quality measures. 
Next, in the second row of the table, we look into whether results are driven by the fact that the 
school is above capacity (over-subscribed) or not (at capacity or under-subscribed). As highlighted in 
Section 4, over-subscribed schools have some discretion in prioritizing pupils for admissions. The 
concern is that popular schools, receiving more admissions requests than they can accommodate, 
might covertly select students with characteristics that are particularly suited to their teaching 
expertise and other school infrastructure specific to one of the three core subjects under analysis. On 
the other hand, we are not concerned with potential selection based on pupil overall ability, as this is 
fully taken care of in the within-pupil specifications. To allay these concerns, Row (2) of Table 4 
presents results obtained excluding over-capacity schools (accounting for approximately 40% of 
pupils in non-specialist schools). The within-pupil estimates of the effects of peers’ quality are similar 
to those obtained before, in particular for the impact of the fraction of bottom 5% new peers, which is 
now slightly larger at -0.100 (s.e. 0.040). Results (not tabulated, but available upon requests) further 
show that our findings are similar for non-specialist secular schools and non-specialist schools with a 
religious affiliation. All in all, the evidence suggests that neither school-side selection of pupils with 
unobservables potentially correlated with ability in a given subject, nor other school institutional 
features are driving our main results.  
Another robustness check assesses whether parental choice of schools with an ‘expertise’ in a 
given subject might confound our estimates of peer effects. To do so, we examine whether our 
findings are driven by sorting of students who choose to attend a school with peers that excel in the 
same subject. More precisely, we identify two groups of students: (i) those who excel in subject q (say 
English) and go to schools where, on average over the four years of our analysis, new peers also excel 
in that subject; and (ii) those who excel in subject q (say, again, English) and go to schools where, on 
average over the years, new peers excel in a different subject (either Mathematics or Science). We 
label these two groups as ‘sorted’ and ‘mixed’ pupils, respectively.17 We then re-run our analysis only 
including ‘mixed’ students to understand whether our results are driven by sorting of pupils with 
similar unobservables that are conducive to excellence in subject q (e.g. English) in the same school. 
Results from this exercise are reported in Row (3) of Table 4 and support our previous findings. Even 
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when considering only ‘mixed’ pupils, we find no significant effects from peers of average quality and 
from the fraction of new peers in the top 5% of the ability distribution. On the other hand, we still find 
a sizeable and statistically significant negative effect from the bottom 5% peers. The estimated impact 
is at -0.100 (s.e. 0.034), which fully confirm our results so far.  
To provide further evidence of the validity of our specifications, we next perform a robustness 
check based on replicating our results for increasingly selected subsets of students with increasingly 
small within-pupil standard deviation of KS2 test scores across the three subjects. While we move 
towards more ‘limited’ samples, we reduce the possibility that there is any correlation between one 
pupil’s subject-specific observed ability and that of his/her peers’. This is because the within-pupil 
variation of age-11 test scores across subjects is forced to become progressively close to zero. In the 
empirical application, we perform this exercise by selecting students with the within-pupil standard 
deviation of KS2 test scores across the three subjects below increasingly smaller thresholds (e.g. 
s.d.≤4, s.d.≤3.5, s.d.≤4, s.d.≤3, etc.).18 Following the reasoning in Altonji et al. (2005), any residual 
sorting on unobservable subject-specific attributes most likely tracks and is upward bounded by the 
amount of selection on observable subject-specific characteristics, in particular lagged tests scores. 
Thus, by focusing on progressively ‘limited’ samples of students with little or no within-pupil 
variation in age-11 achievements and by studying how our estimates of the ability peer effects change, 
we are able to assess whether any residual subject-specific sorting might bias our estimates. 
We present our findings graphically in Figures 1, where we focus on the bottom 5% new peers.19 
The plots present regression coefficients and 95% confidence intervals (standard errors clustered at the 
school level) coming from 23 different regressions estimated separately for progressively small 
subsets of pupils with variation across subject in KS2 test scores falling below predefined thresholds 
of the within-pupil standard deviation of age-11 attainments. These spanned the interval s.d.≤3 to 
s.d.≤11.5, in steps of 0.5, and then std.dev.≤15; std.dev.≤17.5; std.dev.≤23; std.dev.≤26; and full 
sample. Note also that the estimates presented in the top panel come from specifications as in Equation 
(1), where the dependent variable is pupil age-11 achievement, and therefore present the balancing of 
this treatment with respect to pupils’ KS2 test scores. On the other hand, the estimates displayed in the 
bottom panel are obtained from specifications as in Equation (2), and thus present how our the 
treatment effect varies across different groups of pupils. 
The top panel shows that the share of ‘bad’ peers is not significantly related to within-pupil 
variation in KS2 test scores almost throughout the various sub-samples. Even when this relation 
reaches some statistical significance, the degree of unbalancing is very small. Expectedly, as we move 
to more restricted sample of pupils, the balancing gets closer to perfect with estimated coefficients of  
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-0.005, -0.002 and exactly zero for pupils with s.d.≤4, s.d.≤3.5 and s.d.≤3, respectively. However, the 
most remarkable findings from this exercise appear in the bottom panel: even as we shrink the within-
pupil standard deviation of KS2 test scores towards zero, we still find negative and significant 
estimates of the effect of the bottom 5% peers. More importantly, these estimates are stable at 
approximately -0.09 throughout the plot. For example, they takes values of -0.084 (s.e. 0.032) and -
0.109 (s.e. 0.040) for the sets of pupils with s.d.≤11.5 and s.d.≤3 respectively. Furthermore, the 
confidence intervals throughout the figure are largely overlapping, clearly allowing us to reject the 
hypothesis that the estimates are different. 
In conclusion, this last piece of evidence reinforces our main finding (evident in Tables 3 and 4) 
that any residual subject-specific sorting based on unobservable considerations must be sufficiently 
small not to confound our estimates of the effect of peers’ quality conditional on pupil fixed-effects. In 
fact, any bias due to confounding subject-specific unobservables should have a very special pattern so 
as to lead to the same or slightly larger point estimates of the effects of ‘bad’ peers in samples of 
pupils with progressively shrinking degrees of variation in lagged test scores. In particular, selection 
on unobservables should be uncorrelated or negatively related to lagged test scores in order to explain 
these results. This is highly implausible since KS2 test scores are reliable proxies of pupils’ subject-
specific abilities, and it is very likely that pupils with similar subject-specific abilities or preferences 
will sort in the same schools. 
5.3 Extending the group of bottom and top peers beyond the 5% threshold    
One issue that we have so far left un-assessed is our choice of the 5% threshold to define the very 
good and markedly poor peers. Different cut-off points could have been chosen, potentially affecting 
our results. In Figure 2, we tackle this issue directly by looking at whether peers in other parts of the 
ability distribution significantly affect pupils’ age-14 cognitive outcomes. The figure presents 
treatment effect estimates and associated 95% confidence intervals for different measures of the 
bottom and top new peers, and coming from specifications as in Equation (2). For the bottom 
treatment, we define the following five groups: bottom 5%; 5 to 10%; 10 to 15%; 15 to 20% and 20 to 
25%. For the top group, we define the following five peer measures: top 5%; 90 to 95%; 85 t0 90%; 
80 to 85% and 75 to 75%. Note that the sample of ‘treated’ pupils now only includes students in the 
range from 25th to the 75th percentiles of KS2 test scores.  
Figure 2 reveals a markedly asymmetric pattern. All five bottom peer groups have a negative 
effect on other pupils, but this effect is clearly significant only for the first group, and it declines 
sharply in scale as we move away from the very bottom group. On the other hand, the effect of the top 
peers at school is small and insignificant throughout. This suggests that our choice of top 5% and 
bottom 5% peers is not arbitrary and provide clear evidence that: (i) it is only the very bottom 5% of 
news peers that are strongly and negatively associated with pupils’ own age 14 test scores, and not 
‘bad’ peers in other parts of the quality distribution; and (ii) that there is no evidence that ‘good’ peers 
in other parts of the ability distribution affect students’ cognitive outcomes. 
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To conclude this section, we provide an assessment of the magnitude of the negative effect of the 
bottom 5% peer treatment based on the estimates presented in Table 3. To do so, we begin by scaling 
it according to the minimum and maximum values of the bottom treatment variable observed in the 
data, at zero and 20% respectively (see Table 2). A pupil who moves from 20% to 0% of the bottom 
quality peer group would experience an improvement of KS3 test score of about 1.8/2 percentiles, 
which amounts to 0.08/0.09 of the standard deviation of KS3 test score, or 0.16/0.17 if we consider the 
standard deviation of the within-pupil KS3 distribution. Note that these are rather sizeable 
experimental changes, as they correspond to about 20 standard deviation changes in the within-pupil 
peer quality distribution. More modest changes of a 10 percentage point decline in the share of weak 
peers would imply an improvement of around 0.08 of the within-pupil standard deviation in the KS3 
distribution. Relative to other studies that focus on school inputs and interventions, our estimates of 
the effect of academically weak peers capture a medium-to-small sized effect. For example, Lavy 
(2009) estimates the effect of instructional time in secondary schools using the PISA 2006 data and 
reports an average effect for OECD countries of 0.15 of the within-pupil standard deviation of test 
scores across subjects for an additional hour of classroom instruction. These estimates imply that the 
ability peer effects that we estimate here for a 10 percentile decrease in the percentage of bad peers 
quality is equivalent to the effect of half an hour of weekly instruction time. Another possible 
comparison is to the effect size of peer quality estimated in Ammermueller and Pischke (2009) across-
classes within-schools in six European countries. This study reports that one standard deviation change 
in their student background measure of peer composition leads to a 0.17 standard deviation change in 
reading test scores of fourth graders. Finally, Bandiera et al. (2009) study class size effects at 
university using a within-pupil specification similar to ours. Their results show that a one standard 
deviation of the within-pupil class size distribution improves test scores by 0.11 of the within-pupil 
standard deviation of outcomes.  
5.4.  Estimates of the peer effects in small schools 
We next turn to analyze whether the within-pupil estimates of the peer effects are significantly 
different in small schools. As explained in Section 3.3, the possibility that schools implement subject-
specific ability grouping (setting) means that we might underestimate the full extent of the scale of 
peer effects. By focusing on smaller schools and analyzing how our estimates change, we can partly 
allay these concerns. This is because schools with a smaller pupil intake will have fewer classes. 
Therefore students will be more mixed with peers of heterogeneous abilities in smaller schools than 
pupils in larger ones, where more classes can be created to group students according to their abilities. 
Notice that these arrangements stems from the fact that schools receive funding based on pupil number 
and have clear incentives to run classes at maximum capacity (approximately 30/35 students). 
To perform this check, we focus on schools with pupil intake below the median of the year-7 
cohort-size distribution. Stated differently, we consider (approximately) the 50% smallest schools with 
incoming cohort size of at maximum 180 pupils, and with on average of 136 students. Results are 
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reported in the last three rows of Table 4. Rows (4) and (5) present estimates that come from 
specifications as detailed in Equations (1) and (2), respectively. Once more, we find that controlling 
for pupil age-11 test scores in a very flexible way does not affect the within-pupil estimates. These are 
still clearly zero for the effect of the average peer quality and negative significant at around -0.10 for 
the fraction of new peers in the bottom 5% of the ability distribution. On the other hand, we find more 
positive effects for the fraction of top 5% new peers. This points into the direction of better peers 
interacting more with regular students in smaller schools and exercising more positive externalities. 
However, note that neither of the estimates in Rows (4) and (5) is significant at conventional levels. 
To further explore this issue, we also looked at the results for the smallest 25% schools and found that 
the effect of the very bright new peers is in the order of 0.060, but still not statistically significant, with 
an associated standard error of 0.044 (on the other hand, the effect of the bottom 5% new peers rises 
slightly to -0.12 with a standard error of 0.052).  
One further advantage of focusing on small schools is that their peers’ subject-specific quality is 
more likely to display significant year-on-year variation due to random subject-specific cohort shocks 
(recall that general cohort-specific unobserved effects are account for by our regression). We can 
exploit this fact to further augment our specifications with school-by-subject fixed-effects that account 
for subject-specific school unobservables – such as teachers’ expertise in a given field – which might 
drive pupils’ and their peers’ sorting. We estimate this specification using only the first and last cohort 
in our data in order to maximize the variation over time that we can exploit to estimate ability peer 
effects. Indeed, this approach is very demanding since conditional on pupil fixed-effects our data 
shows very little within-school-subject variation over time, in particular in terms of students’ age-14 
outcomes. This is because the ‘spread’ of pupils’ KS3 test scores around their average is not 
significantly widening or vanishing over time within schools. This fact is perhaps not surprising given 
that we are considering standardized test scores and that schools’ composition does not dramatically 
changes over four years. Even then, our results (presented in Row 6 of Table 4) broadly support our 
previous conclusions. The effects of the average peer quality and the fraction of top 5% new peers are 
still estimated to be small and insignificant. On the other hand, the peer effect from the very weak 
students is estimated to be a significant -0.070 (s.e. 0.021), only between 20-30% smaller than our 
main estimates.  
5.5.  Additional findings: peer effects estimates by subject coupled 
We mentioned in Section 3 that one of the underlying assumption of the identification strategy is that 
peer effects are constant across different subjects. Although this assumption is difficult to test, we 
looked for some related evidence by running regressions separately for couples of subjects, i.e. by 
pooling observations for: English and Mathematics only; English and Science only; and Mathematics 
and Science only. Results are not tabulated for space reasons, but are available from the authors.  
Our previous findings for the average quality of peers and the fraction of top 5% new peers were 
confirmed for all pairs of subjects. On the other hand, we found stronger peer effects from students in 
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the bottom 5% of the ability distribution coming from the comparison of English with Mathematics 
and English with Science, than when only pooling Mathematics and Science. For the former two 
couples of subjects, estimates of effect of ‘bad’ peers were -0.102 (s.e. 0.059) and -0.116 (s.e. 0.057) 
respectively, whereas the comparison of Science and Mathematics yielded a smaller estimate of -0.049 
(s.e. 0.040). This is perhaps unsurprising given that, as discussed in Section 4, pupils’ KS3 test scores 
are much more correlated for Science and Mathematics (0.80), than for English and Mathematics 
(0.64) or English and Science (0.68). As a result, there is less within-pupil across-subject variation in 
age-14 test scores to precisely estimate peer quality effects. Indeed, the within-pupil variations for 
English-Mathematics and English-Science are 10.8 and 10.2, respectively 35% and 27.5% higher than 
the within-pupil variation for Mathematics-Science, at about 8.0. Moreover, the institutional details 
discussed above suggest that ‘ability setting’ is more common in Mathematics and Science than in 
English. Given the high correlation between pupil’s attainments in these two subjects, it is likely that 
the one student will be ‘set’ at a similar level in these two subjects, thus facing peers of similar quality 
in both Science and Mathematics. Stated differently, both the within-pupil variation of the peers that 
the student actually interacts with, and the within-pupil variation in age-14 test scores might be too 
small to identify a significant peer effect. All in all, however, we believe the findings presented in this 
section broadly support our assumption that peer effects are similar across subjects.  
6.  Allowing for Heterogeneous Effects 
6.1.  Heterogeneity by students’ ability 
In this section, we test for the presence of heterogeneous effects along a variety of dimensions. We 
first examine if the very good, the very bad and the average peers differentially affect students with 
different academic abilities. For this purpose, we stratify the sample into six groups according to the 
distribution of pupils’ average of their KS2 percentiles across subjects. The percentile-ranges that 
define the six non-overlapping groups are as follows: 5-20; 20-35; 35-50; 50-65; 65-80; and 80-95. 
Our regression models now simultaneously include interaction terms of the percentages of top 5% 
peers, bottom 5% peers and average peer quality (separately for old and new peers) with dummies 
indicating to which of the six KS2 ability groups a pupil belongs to. Note that the effect of KS2 
achievements in the same- and cross-subject is controlled for semi-parametrically by interacting 
pupils’ own KS2 percentiles with the dummies indicating his/her rank in the ability distribution (as 
well as subject dummies). 
These findings are reported in Table 5. The estimates presented in Column (1) reveal that the 
quality of average peers does not affect regular pupils’ age-14 test scores at any point of the ability 
distribution. On the other hand, Column (2) shows the negative effect of the bottom 5% new peers is 
roughly constant across various ability groups of regular students. In fact, there is some variation in 
the point estimates, with larger negative effects for pupils in the 50th to 80th percentiles of the ability 
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distribution (at around -0.11) and insignificant negative effects for the most able pupils (of about -
0.04). However, an F-test on the hypothesis that all coefficients are equal clearly accepts the null. 
Results for the effect of peers in the top 5% of the ability distribution reveal a more interesting 
pattern; these are presented in Column (3). On the one hand, they confirm our main finding, namely 
that there is no significant peer effect from very academically bright pupils on other regular students. 
An F-test for the joint significance of the treatment at the various parts of the ability distribution 
clearly accepts the null of no effect. On the other hand, while the impact of the top 5% peers is 
positive (insignificant) in the bottom two-thirds of the ability distribution of regular students, it turns 
negative (insignificant) for the most able pupils with average age-11 test scores between the 65th and 
90th percentile. Consistently, an F-test on the null that all coefficients are equal rejects the hypothesis 
at the 10% level of confidence with a p-value of 0.080. 
Since this finding is rather unexpected, we have assessed its robustness along a number of 
directions. For example, we have tested that it survives when we restrict our attention to pupils with 
less potential for subject-specific sorting, as identified by students with a limited standard deviation of 
KS2 across subjects (i.e. pupils with s.d.≤3; see the discussion in Section 5.3). Similarly, we have 
tested that this pattern is not driven by the inclusion of specialist schools or over-subscribed schools. 
Finally, another possible and rather mechanical explanation for why pupils who are good on average 
marginally suffer from having many top 5% peers might be related to mean-reversion. In general, 
average test scores reveal some mean reversion. Pupils in the 5th-20th percentile at KS2 experience a 4 
percentile point average improvement in their average KS3 test score, while students in the 80th-95th 
KS2 percentile have an average 5.6 percentiles deterioration in their average KS3. However, the 
within-pupil standard deviations of KS2 for students in the same ability group must be similar by 
construction. This means that all pupils within the same ability group, in particular those in the 80th-
95th KS2 percentile, would be similarly affected by mean-reversion irrespective of how many good 
peers they interact with. Moreover, if mean reversion was to explain our findings, we would expect 
this to affect both the top and the bottom of the ability distribution. However, we do not observe any 
interaction between either the top 5% peers or the bottom 5% peers and the fact that a student ranks 
low in the KS2 ability distribution. To shed further light on this issue, we formally checked whether 
the pure effect of belonging to the top-group in the average KS2 ability distribution (80th-95th 
percentile) is related to the KS3 outcomes of students, but failed to find any evidence. In a nutshell, 
mean reversion does not appear to be a likely explanation for these patterns. Anticipating our findings, 
we find that this result is completely driven by the negative and significant response of boys to a large 
fraction of top 5% peers, which become particularly strong for the most able male students. We 
carefully investigate these issues in the next section. 
6.2. Gender heterogeneity in treatment effects  
In this section, we analyze the heterogeneity of peer effects by gender. This is particularly interesting 
given that a growing body of evidence shows that girls are more affected than boys by education 
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inputs and intervention.20 Moreover, peer effects might work in significantly different ways for male 
and female students during secondary education, a time when both the identification with and the 
social interactions between the two genders intensify. We report our first set of results in Table 6. The 
top panel looks at boys (Columns (1) and (2)) and girls (Columns (3) and (4)) separately, but pooling 
pupils of all abilities. The bottom panel of the table instead further ranks students by their KS2 average 
ability. More details about the specifications are provided in the note to the table. Note that all 
regressions further include the average quality of peers. However, since this treatment did not reveal 
any significantly heterogeneous pattern, we have decided not to tabulate these coefficients (results 
available upon request).  
Results in the Panel A of the table show that the effect of the bottom 5% peers is negative and 
significant in both gender groups, although is it slightly smaller for boys (at -0.076) than for girls (at -
0.098). On the other hand, the effect of the top 5% peers is positive, significant and sizeable at 0.066 
for girls, but negative for boys at -0.052, and significant at better than the 10% level (p-value: 0.068). 
These patterns are not easily explained by differential subject-specific sorting for boys and girls into 
schools with peers of different quality. In fact, we find no significant relation between the within-pupil 
across subject variation in age-11 achievement and the variation in the fraction of top 5% new peers in 
different subjects for boys, and a small negative relation for girls (with coefficient of -0.064 and a 
standard error of 0.015), indicating some degree of negative sorting for female students. This clearly 
suggests that selection can hardly be driving our results: if this was the case, we should find more 
positive effects for boys than for girls (unless selection occurs on subject-specific unobservables that 
are negatively correlated with age-11 test scores)21. Note that we also checked whether our results are 
driven by the inclusion of single-sex schools. These enroll approximately 2% of the boys in our 
sample, and slightly more than 4% of the female students. Although results obtained after excluding 
these pupils were slightly weaker, they provided a similar picture: the effect of the bottom 5% peers is 
negative for both boys and girls, but the effect of the most academically talented peers is positive for 
female students and negative for males. 
To shed further light on these patterns, we next study the sign and size of ability peer effects 
separately of boys and girls, and in interaction with students’ own ability. Results are presented in 
Panel B of Table 6, and replicate the structure of Table 5. For both boys and girls, we find that the 
effect of many ‘bad’ peers at school is relatively stable throughout the ability distribution of regular 
students. The negative impact of bottom 5% peers is slightly stronger for pupils in the 50th-80th 
percentile range of the ability distribution. However, there is little evidence that these differences are 
                                                 
20
 For example, Anderson (2008) shows that three well-known early childhood interventions (namely, 
Abecedarian, Perry and the Early Training Project) had substantial short- and long-term effects on girls, but no 
effect on boys. Likewise, the Moving to Opportunity randomized evaluation of housing vouchers generated clear 
benefits for girls, with little or even adverse effects on boys (Katz et al., 2001). Some recent studies also show a 
consistent pattern of stronger female response to financial incentives in education, with the evidence coming 
from a variety of settings (see Angrist and Lavy, 2009 and Angrist et al., 2009). 
21
 Results unconditional on pupil’s age-11 test scores confirmed these heterogeneous patterns for boys and girls. 
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statistically significant: an F-test on the hypothesis that all coefficients are equal accepts the null with 
p-values of 0.2597 and 0.6809 for boys and girls, respectively. 
A more interesting pattern of results emerges when we focus on the effect of the top 5% new 
peers. Looking at girls first, we find that the impact of academically bright peers is positive throughout 
the ability distribution, although this effect is more pronounced and statistically significant for female 
students with KS2 achievements below the median of the ability distribution. On the other hand, the 
impact of top 5% peers becomes smaller and looses significance for the most talented girls, in 
particular for those with age-11 achievement above the 80th percentile, where the estimated coefficient 
is small and insignificant at 0.011 (s.e. 0.039). In sharp contrast, we find that the impact of having 
many ‘good’ peers at school is negative for males throughout the ability distribution, although this 
adverse effect is only statistically significant for the most able boys. The estimated impact for males 
with average KS2 test scores in the 65th to 80th percentile is -0.079 (s.e. 0.037), and further increases to 
-0.096 (s.e. 0.043) for those in the 80th to 95th percentile bracket. Note that we checked once again 
whether our results are driven by mean-reversion or ceiling effects. However, this does not seem the 
case. We also pondered whether one possible explanation for this result is that there are too few boys 
relative to girls at the top of the ability distribution to properly estimate separate effects for boys and 
girls in different ability groups, but this does not seem to be the case. Thus, a natural conclusion is that 
these effects are ‘real’, and the main question is what could explain them.  
One possible explanation is based on ‘crowding-out’ effects: if we shift the ability distribution so 
as to have more of the very best top 5% students at school, this might crowd-out students who are in 
the next ability groups (65th-80th and 80th-95th percentiles) from advanced activities, such as Science 
and Mathematics ‘clubs’, or special field trips because of limited space available in such activities. To 
clarify this, consider that there usually is only a limited number of places available in top-tier 
activities/clubs for each subject in each school irrespective of cohort size. Under this scenario, having 
many good peers in that subject has two ‘competing’ effects for regular pupils, in particular for those 
in the top part of the ability distribution. On the one hand, there could be a positive effect that works 
either directly through interaction of students during instructional time, or indirectly via the teaching 
body (e.g. instructors’ motivation). On the other hand, a large share of outstanding peers would reduce 
one student’s chances of getting into the top extra-activities and participating in advanced level 
learning, thus depressing his/her motivation and ultimately potentially harming achievement. This 
counter-balancing effect should be more pronounced for the next-to-the-most able students, i.e. pupils 
in the 65th to 95th percentile of the ability distribution.  
One implication of this line of reasoning is that these negative effects should be mitigated in 
smaller schools. In fact, in these schools the positive effect of having many top 5% peers should 
prevail, since there is at the same time more room for interactions of pupils of different abilities and 
less scope for crowding-out of good students from top-tier activities. To check for this possibility, we 
re-run the analysis displayed in the bottom panel of Table 6 on the sample that only includes the 50% 
smallest schools. Our findings show that for schools in the bottom half of the cohort-size distribution 
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the positive impact of the top 5% peers for girls is positive and roughly constant throughout the ability 
distribution of regular students. Moreover, the effect of good peers is larger than before for girls in the 
top one-third of the ability distribution at approximately 0.075, although this estimate is not 
statistically significant. As for boys, we still find that a large share of top 5% peers at school has a 
negative impact on regular students, although the effects are now insignificant throughout the ability 
distribution and smaller in the top percentiles, at approximately -0.052. All in all, the evidence 
suggests that a crowding-out explanation of our findings might bear some relevance. However, this 
hypothesis cannot easily account for the still markedly different results that we document for males 
and female. In conclusion, we cannot exclude other more subtle explanations discussed in the 
educational and psychological literature, for example "big-fish-small-pond" mechanisms, which could 
be more pronounced for male students (see Marsh, 2005). 
To conclude this section, we look at whether peer effects for boys and girls differ according to 
the gender of their peers. To do so, we re-compute the fraction of top 5% and bottom 5% new peers 
separately for male and female students, and re-run regressions similar to those in Panel A of Table 6, 
but including: the fraction of top 5% boys; the fraction of bottom 5% boys; the fraction of top 5% 
girls; and the fraction of bottom 5% girls. The average quality of peers is controlled for in these 
regressions, but not split along the gender dimension. This is because we found little evidence that 
peers of average quality matter for age-14 test scores of boys and girls. Note that the fractions of 
bottom 5% and top 5% new peers are now computed on very small number of students. Therefore, the 
statistical significance of our results is less indicative than the sign and magnitude of the coefficients.  
These findings are presented in Table 7. Panel A tabulates results for boys, whereas Panel B deals 
with girls. Considering first the effect of the bottom 5% students, we find that boys are similarly 
affected by bad peers of both genders. Although the point estimates are slightly different across peers’ 
gender, a test on the equality of the two coefficients accepts the null. Moreover, the estimated effect 
sizes are very close, at 0.405 and 0.452 for male and female peers respectively. These capture the 
percentage effect of one within-pupil standard change in either treatment on the within-pupil standard 
deviation in age-14 test scores. As for girls, evidence suggests that they are negatively affected by 
academically weak peers of both genders, although the adverse impact of bad female peers is more 
marked. Even though an F-test on the equality of the two coefficients accepts the null, the effect size 
of the bottom 5% female peers is almost twice as big as the one for bad male peers.  
At the opposite end of the ability spectrum, we find that boys react more negatively to a large 
share of academically bright male peers, with an estimated coefficient is -0.073 (s.e. 0.039) 
corresponding to an effect size of negative 0.600. On the other hand the coefficient on the proportion 
of outstanding female peers coefficient is -0.034 (s.e. 0.044), with an effect size of negative 0.294. 
Remarkably, the opposite is true for girls, who respond more positively to bright peers of the same 
gender. The estimated effect of the top 5% female peers on other girls is 0.077 (s.e. 0.043) with an 
associated effect size of 0.797, whereas the effect of top 5% boys is as small as 0.037 (s.e. 0.042) with 
an effect size of 0.286.  
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6.3 Additional findings: heterogeneity by pupils’ eligibility for free school meals 
In this section, we briefly examine the heterogeneity of ability peer effects by pupils’ eligibility for 
free school meals (FSM), a proxy for family income. To do so, we follow that same approach we used 
to look at gender differences in treatment effects. Namely, we first look at estimates obtained by 
pooling pupils of all ability groups, and then further break down peer quality estimates by pupils’ own 
ability. Results are not shown for space reasons, but are available upon request.  
Broadly speaking, results do not highlight any significant heterogeneity. Irrespective of pupils’ 
eligibility for FSM, the bottom 5% new peers have a large and significantly negative impact on 
students’ KS3 attainments. This is estimated to be -0.11 (s.e. 0.040) for FSM-eligible students, and -
0.08 (s.e. 0.035) for pupils from richer background. On the other hand, we find that the average quality 
of peers and the fraction of good peers at school do not have any significant effect on students’ 
performance irrespective of their FSM status. Similarly, we find very little evidence of heterogeneous 
effects when we further allow our estimates to vary along the dimension of pupils’ ability. The 
negative effect of bad peers is sizeable and significant throughout for pupils of all aptitudes and 
irrespective of their FSM eligibility, except for students with KS2 average test scores in the 80th-95th 
percentile bracket, where the estimated impact remains negative but turns insignificant. On the other 
hand, the percentage of top 5% new peers has no significant impact on students’ achievements 
irrespective of their ability and eligibility for free meals. Finally, we do not detect any interesting 
pattern for the effect of average peer quality. All in all, we find no evidence of heterogeneous peer 
effects along the dimension of family income. 
7. Concluding remarks and some policy implications 
In this paper, we have estimated ability peer effects in schools using data for all secondary schools in 
England for four cohorts of age-14 (9th grade) pupils and measuring peers’ quality by their academic 
ability as recorded by test scores at age-11 (6th grade). In order to shed some light on the nature of peer 
effects, we have estimated both the effect of average peer quality, as well as the effect of being at 
school with a high proportion of very low-ability and very high-ability pupils, on the cognitive 
outcomes of regular students. Our analysis is highly relevant because of its strong external validity: 
our data includes over 90 percent of four cohorts of pupils in England that transit from primary school 
through to the third year of secondary schooling, and sit for two crucial standardized national tests, 
namely the Key Stage 2 (6th grade) and Key Stage 3 (9th grade). Additionally, our sample is large 
enough to allow us to recover a variety of estimates about the heterogeneity of our treatment effects.  
From a methodological perspective, we view our main contribution as twofold. Firstly, we 
measure peer ability by test scores that directly capture the cognitive ability of pupils and that are pre-
determined with respect to peer interactions in secondary schools, since they are measured at the end 
of primary education before pupils change schools to start their secondary education. Moreover, by 
focusing only on peer quality measures based on new peers in secondary schools we by-pass reflection 
problems. Secondly, we offer a new approach to measuring peer effects, by focusing on within-pupil 
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variation in performance across multiple subjects in a setting where peers’ quality is also measured by 
the variation in their ability across subjects. By using student fixed-effect estimation we are 
simultaneously able to control for family, school-by-cohort fixed effects and other cohort-specific 
unobserved shocks, as well as pupil ability that is constant across subjects. Our findings strongly 
suggests that the within-pupil specifications take care of most of the sorting of pupils and their peers 
into secondary education, and provide reliable causal estimates of ability peer effects. However, to 
further support this claim, we have provided an extensive battery of robustness checks and 
falsification exercises that lend additional credibility to the causal interpretation of our results.  
In terms of findings, our results clearly show that a large fraction of ‘bad’ peers at school as 
identified by students in the bottom 5% of the ability distribution is detrimental to other pupils’ 
learning. On the other hand, we uncover little evidence that the average peer quality and the fraction of 
very ‘good’ peers as identified by students in the top 5% of the ability distribution affects the 
educational outcomes of other pupils across the board. However, these findings mask a significant 
degree of heterogeneity along the gender dimension. One striking result is that the very brilliant peers 
at school negatively impact the academic performance of boys, and in particular those who are among 
the highest groups at school in terms of ability. On the other hand, girls benefit more from having high 
achievers at school, although there is some evidence that the most able ability girls among regular 
students at school benefit the least from these interactions.  
More in details, we have shown that a 10 percentile decrease in the proportion of ‘bad’ peers at 
school implies an improvement of approximately 0.07/0.09 of the within-pupil standard deviation of 
age-14 test scores for both boys and girls. On the other hand, a 10 percentage point increase in the 
percentage of ‘good’ peers would imply an improvement of 0.06 in the within-pupil standard deviation 
of KS3 achievements for girls and a nearly symmetrical negative effect for boys of 0.05. These 
differences become more remarkable if we consider boys and girls of different abilities. For the most 
talented males, a 10 percentage point increase in the proportion of top 5% peers implies up to 0.09 
decrease in the within-pupil standard deviation of age-14 test scores. In sharp contrast, this same 
increase would boost achievements by more than 0.11 for the least able girls.  
These heterogeneous patterns allow us to perform some concluding thought-experiments. To 
begin with, suppose that our regular students were exposed to the following two treatments 
simultaneously: a reduction in the percentage of top 5% and bottom 5% new peers from 20% (the 
maximum in our data) to zero (the minimum in our data). This change can be viewed as a move 
towards class homogeneity in terms of ability, that is a sort of tracking. This shift would 
unambiguously improve male students’ KS3 achievements by about 0.22 of a standard deviation 
(0.13+0.09) if we consider the within-pupil dispersion of KS3 achievements. Interestingly, this effect 
is not dissimilar for the most and least able boys, and is only slightly larger than the findings in Duflo 
et al. (2008) who document a 0.14 standard deviation improvement in the test score of pupils in 
primary schools in Kenya after 18 months of random assignment to homogenous ‘tracked’ classes. On 
the other hand, our thought-experiment would give more heterogeneous results for girls. On average, 
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the shift would improve female students’ age-14 achievements by about 0.06 of a (within-pupil) 
standard deviation. This overall positive effect is the sum of the positive impact of not interacting with 
academically weak peers (at +0.18) and the adverse effect of reduced interactions with the best peers 
(-0.12). However, this overall effect would turn negative for girls in the bottom half of the ability 
distribution, with regular students in the ability bracket of 20th-35th percentile loosing out as much as 
0.10 of a (within-pupil) standard deviation. At the other extreme, the most talented girls could gain 
more than 0.20 of a (within-pupil) standard deviation of age-14 achievements from being educated in 
homogeneous environments with negligible fractions of ‘bad’ and ‘good’ peers. 
Another policy-relevant experiment would be to simulate the effects of tracking by grouping all 
students – including the bottom 5% and top 5% – into two classes perfectly segregated along the lines 
of student’s ability. The first group would include pupils who are above the median of the ability 
distribution, and the second those below the median. In this case, the lower ability group will 
experience a doubling of the proportion of bottom 5% pupils, on average from 4% to 8%, and a 
decline of the proportion of top 5% pupils from about 4% to zero. For the high ability class, the 
opposite will occur as the proportion of top 5% pupils doubles to about 8% and the proportion of 
bottom 5% falls to zero. These shifts would unambiguously worsens students’ KS3 achievements in 
the low ability group, with a negative impact of about -0.03 in the within-pupil standard deviation of 
KS3 for boys, and -0.06 (-0.04-0.02) for girls. On the other hand, the changes experienced in the high 
ability group would improve boys’ KS3 achievements by at most 0.01 (0.03-0.02) of a within-pupil 
standard deviation of KS3, while girls would benefit by up to 0.06 (0.04+0.02).  
Do our results lend overall support to tracking of students by ability? Besides any equity 
consideration, we have shown that there is no simple answer to this question from an efficiency-of-
learning point of view. Making schools more homogeneous by excluding both very good and very bad 
peers would result in an overall improvement in students’ performance because, in our full sample, we 
find no positive effects stemming from a large fraction of top 5% new peers and significantly negative 
effects from bad peers. However, as we have just shown, our results are clearly heterogeneous in 
relation to one pupils’ ability and gender, and vary according to the exact details of the tracking-
experiment being carried out. One fairly stable finding is that female students above the median of the 
ability distribution could significantly benefit from either form of tracking, although other groups can 
be net losers or gainers (or unaffected) depending on the precise nature of ability grouping. In 
conclusion, despite not giving a one-size-fit-all policy recommendation, we believe our findings are 
rich enough to provide a solid ground for insightful interventions targeting students’ ability mix as a 
means to improve learning standards. 
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Table 1 – Descriptive statistics: pupils’ outcomes, pupils’ background and school characteristics 
Variable Regular students At least 1 subject top 5% At least 1 subject bottom 5% 
Panel A: Pupils’ outcomes  
KS2 percentile, English 49.3 (24.3) 87.1 (14.8) 8.5 (12.5) 
KS2 percentile, Mathematics 49.4 (24.3) 87.0 (14.1) 9.4 (13.6) 
KS2 percentile, Science 48.9 (24.3) 87.7 (13.1) 10.9 (15.5) 
KS3 percentile, English 48.9 (26.0) 81.2 (18.6) 15.3 (18.2) 
KS3 percentile, Mathematics 49.2 (25.3) 84.5 (16.3) 14.8 (17.6) 
KS3 percentile, Science 49.2 (25.5) 84.4 (16.2) 16.0 (17.9) 
    
Panel B: Pupils’ characteristics    
First language is English 0.93 (0.253) 0.95 (0.21) 0.89 (0.31) 
Eligible for free school meals 0.13 (0.337) 0.05 (0.22) 0.30 (0.46) 
Male 0.50 (0.500) 0.48 (0.50) 0.55 (0.50) 
Changed school between Year 7 and KS3 0.11 (0.313) 0.09 (0.29) 0.14 (0.35) 
Ethnicity: White British 0.85 (0.35) 0.88 (0.32) 0.81 (0.39) 
Ethnicity: White other 0.02 (0.12) 0.02 (0.13) 0.02 (0.14) 
Ethnicity: Asian 0.05 (0.22) 0.03 (0.18) 0.07 (0.26) 
Ethnicity: Black 0.03 (0.16) 0.01 (0.11) 0.04 (0.19) 
Ethnicity: Chinese 0.00 (0.05) 0.00 (0.07) 0.00 (0.04) 
Ethnicity: Other 0.05 (0.22) 0.07 (0.21) 0.06 (0.24) 
    
Panel C: School characteristics (Year 7)   
Cohort size      201.7 (57.2)      204.1 (56.3)       198.8 (58.5) 
Community school 0.67 (0.47) 0.63 (0.48) 0.73 (0.44) 
Religiously affiliated school 0.16 (0.37) 0.19 (0.39) 0.11 (0.32) 
    
Note: Table report means of the listed variables and standard deviation in parenthesis. Number of regular pupils: approximately 
1,200,000. The sample of regular students only includes pupils with KS2 achievement in each subject above the 5th percentile and 
below the 95th percentile of KS2 cohort-specific national distribution. Number of pupils with at least one subject in top 5% (≥95th 
percentile of KS2 cohort-specific national distribution): approximately 170,000. Number of pupils with at least one subject in bottom 
5% (≤5th percentile of KS2 cohort-specific national distribution): approximately 130,000. Year 7 refers to the first year in secondary 
school after transition out of primary. KS3 refers to Year 9 when pupils sit for their KS3 assessment. Community schools include only 
secular comprehensive state schools. Religiously affiliated schools include only schools in the state sector with some religious 
affiliation. Fractions may not sum to 1; this is due to rounding or partially missing information. 
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Table 2 – Descriptive statistics of treatments: average KS2 achievements and percentages of pupils in top 5% 
and bottom 5% of KS2 ability distribution – new peers only 
Variable Mean  Std. dev. Min Max 
Panel A: Average KS2 percentile treatment (new peers)     
Average peer achievement at KS2 in English 49.79 8.71 1 98 
Average peer achievement at KS2 in Math 49.94 8.06 1   100 
Average peer achievement at KS2 in Science 49.68 8.35 1   100 
     
Panel B: Top 5% treatment (new peers)     
Percentage, top 5% in English 4.22 3.03 0 19.56 
Percentage, top 5% in Maths 3.77 2.60 0 19.87 
Percentage, top 5% in Science 3.91 2.75 0 19.86 
     
Panel C: Bottom 5% treatment (new peers)     
Percentage, bottom 5% in English 3.79 2.78 0 19.30 
Percentage, bottom 5% in Maths 3.81 2.67 0 19.86 
Percentage, bottom 5% in Science 3.78 2.90 0 19.78 
     
Percentage of new peers for pupils in Year 7 87.56       22.66 0 1 
     
Note: Treatment measured in Year 7 when students start secondary school after transition from primary. New peers refers to students 
in Year 7 in a given cohort that do not come from the same primary school.  
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Table 3 – Impact of peer quality on KS3 educational attainments: main results 
 Average peer KS2 Percentage of bottom 5% pupils Percentage of top 5% pupils  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable is: OLS Within-pupil OLS Within-pupil OLS Within-pupil 
       
KS3 percentiles, unconditional on KS2; treatments entered separately 0.359 
    (0.012)** 
0.022 
(0.012) 
-0.958 
     (0.029)** 
-0.120 
     (0.033)** 
0.750 
   (0.028)** 
0.003 
 (0.003) 
       
KS3 percentiles, unconditional on KS2; all treatments together 0.191 
    (0.013)** 
0.018 
(0.013) 
-0.592 
     (0.032)** 
-0.095 
     (0.033)** 
0.332 
   (0.029)** 
-0.021 
 (0.026) 
       
KS3 percentiles, controlling for KS2 same-subject interacted with subject  
dummies; all treatments together 
0.161 
    (0.011)** 
0.012 
(0.012) 
-0.566 
     (0.030)** 
-0.091 
     (0.033)** 
0.244 
    (0.027)** 
0.005 
 (0.026) 
       
KS3 percentiles, controlling for KS2 same- and cross-subject interacted  
with subject dummies; all treatments together 
0.146 
    (0.011)** 
0.010 
(0.012) 
-0.511 
     (0.030)** 
-0.089 
    (0.033)** 
0.227 
   (0.027)** 
0.008 
 (0.026) 
       
Note: The table reports regression coefficients and standard errors in round brackets from regressions of the dependent variable on treatments. **: at least 1% significant. Treatment effects in the first 
row estimated from two different sets of regressions: one including the average peer achievement at KS2 only (Columns (1) and (2)); and one including the percentage of top 5% pupils and the 
percentage of bottom 5% pupils in the cohort only (Columns (3) to (6)). All other regressions include all three treatments together. The table displays the coefficients on treatments based on new peers 
only. All regressions control for quality of old peers, and include subject and subject-by-gender dummies. Pupil characteristics controlled for in Columns (1), (3) and (5); absorbed in Columns (2), (4) 
and (6). Number of observations: approx. 3,600,000 (1,200,000 pupils), in 2193 schools. 
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Table 4 – Impact of peer quality on KS3 educational attainments: robustness to potential threats to 
identification and results for small schools only 
 Within-pupil estimates 
 Average peer 
KS2 
Percentage of 
bottom 5% pupils 
Percentage of 
top 5% pupils 
Dependent variable is: (2) (4) (6) 
    
KS3 percentiles, controlling for KS2: excluding specialist schools 0.010 
(0.013) 
-0.091 
     (0.034)** 
0.013 
(0.027) 
    
KS3 percentiles, controlling for KS2: undersubscribed schools 
(excluding specialist) 
0.013 
(0.017) 
-0.100 
     (0.040)** 
0.011 
(0.037) 
    
KS3 percentiles, controlling for KS2: sample of pupils whose best 
subject is different from the best subject of new peers (mixed) 
0.008 
(0.013) 
-0.100 
     (0.034)** 
0.014 
(0.027) 
    
KS3 percentiles, unconditional on KS2: pupils in 50% smallest schools 
 0.005 
 (0.013) 
-0.109 
      (0.045)** 
0.028 
(0.038) 
 
   
KS3 percentiles, controlling for KS2: pupils in 50% smallest schools 
-0.002 
 (0.013) 
-0.104 
      (0.044)** 
0.063 
(0.038) 
 
   
KS3 percentiles, controlling for KS2: pupils in 50% smallest schools; 
including pupils fixed effects and school × subject fixed effects 
 0.003 
 (0.006) 
-0.070 
     (0.021)** 
0.006 
 (0.017) 
    
Note: All specifications as in Row (4) of Table 3, except in Row (4) where the specification does not control for lagged test scores. 
Specification in Rows (6) further includes school-by-subject fixed effects. Specialist schools account for about 8.5% of the pupil 
sample. Undersubscribed schools enrol approximately 60% of pupils in non-specialist schools. Sample of pupils with different best 
subject from new peers in school account for about 60% of the full sample. Sample of pupils in 50% smallest schools includes pupils 
in schools with less than 181 students in the year 7 cohort (approx. 6 classes of max 30 students). Regression with school × subject 
fixed effect (Row (6)) only considers the first cohort (year 7 in 2002) and last cohort (year 7 in 2005). Standard error clustered at the 
school level, except Rows (6) where they are robust. **: at least 1% significant. 
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Table 5 – Impact of peer quality on KS3 attainments: by pupil’s ability 
 Within-pupil estimates 
Average peer KS2 Percentage of bottom 5% pupils Percentage of top 5% pupils 
Dependent variable is: KS3, 
controlling for KS2 (1) (2) (3) 
    
Effect for percentiles 5-20 0.011 
(0.012) 
-0.081 
    (0.029)** 
 0.016 
 (0.026) 
Effect for percentiles 20-35 0.010 
(0.015) 
-0.068 
   (0.035)* 
0.044 
(0.030) 
Effect for percentiles 35-50 0.012 
(0.015) 
-0.074 
  (0.041)§ 
0.023 
(0.032) 
Effect for percentiles 50-65 0.011 
(0.016) 
-0.118 
     (0.043)** 
0.020 
(0.033) 
Effect for percentiles 65-80 0.005 
(0.015) 
-0.114 
     (0.043)** 
-0.027 
 (0.031) 
Effect for percentiles 80-95 0.016 
(0.017) 
-0.038 
 (0.050) 
-0.049 
 (0.032) 
    
F-Test: all coeffs. jointly 
equal to zero (p-value) 0.9317 0.0321 0.1311 
F-Test: all coefficients are 
equal (p-value) 0.9816 0.2564 0.0801 
    
Note: The table reports regression coefficients and standard errors in round brackets from regressions of the dependent variable on 
treatments. Treatment effects estimated from one single regression including all three treatments together. The table displays the 
coefficient on treatments based on new peers. All regressions control for the quality of old peers. Interaction terms obtained by 
interacting the peer quality measures (separately for old and new peers) with a dummy indicating where the pupil ranks in terms of 
his/her KS2 percentiles on average across subjects. Ability blocks are defined using original KS2 percentiles computed out of the 
cohort-specific national distribution. The effect of KS2 achievement (same- and cross-subject) is controlled for semi-parametrically 
by interacting pupil KS2 percentiles with the dummies indicating his/her rank in the ability distribution (and in interaction with 
subject dummies). Specifications further include subject and subject-by-gender dummies. Number of observations: approximately 
3,600,000 (1,200,000 pupils), in 2193 schools. Standard error clustered at the school level. **: at least 1% significant; *: at least 5% 
significant; §: at least 10% significant.  
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Table 6 – Impact of peer quality on KS3 attainments, by pupil’s ability and gender 
  Within-pupil estimates  
 Boys only Girls only 
 Percentage of bottom 
5% pupils 
Percentage of top 
5% pupils 
 Percentage of bottom 
5% pupils 
Percentage of top 
5% pupils 
Dependent variable is: 
KS3, controlling for KS2 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
       
Panel A: Pupils of ability pooled (overall effect)    
       
Overall effect   -0.076 
  (0.035)* 
-0.052 
  (0.028)§ 
 -0.098 
    (0.037)** 
0.066 
  (0.029)* 
       
Panel B: Ability blocks defined on original KS2 percentiles    
       
Effect for  
percentiles 5-20 
 -0.093 
     (0.032)** 
-0.013 
(0.029) 
 -0.080 
  (0.038)* 
0.066 
 (0.035)§ 
Effect for  
percentiles 20-35 
 -0.057 
(0.039) 
-0.037 
 (0.033) 
 -0.072 
  (0.044)§ 
0.126 
    (0.037)** 
Effect for 
percentiles 35-50 
  -0.068 
 (0.046) 
-0.059 
 (0.036) 
 -0.066 
 (0.047) 
0.088 
  (0.039)* 
Effect for  
percentiles 50-65 
 -0.106 
  (0.048)* 
-0.036 
 (0.038) 
 -0.113 
   (0.050)* 
0.062 
(0.038)§ 
Effect for  
percentiles 65-80 
 -0.089 
  (0.051)§ 
-0.079 
   (0.037)* 
 -0.139 
     (0.050)** 
0.023 
(0.036) 
Effect for  
percentiles 80-95 
 0.036 
(0.065) 
-0.096 
   (0.043)* 
 -0.116 
   (0.060)* 
0.011 
(0.039) 
       
F-Test: all coeff.  jointly 
equal to zero (p-value) 
 0.0425 0.2642  0.1042 0.0334 
F-Test: all coefficients are 
equal (p-value) 
 0.2597 0.4281  0.6809 0.0766 
       
Note: Specifications in Panel A as in Row (4) of Table 3; specifications in Panel B as in Table 5. Separate regressions run for boys 
and girls. Number of observations for boys: approx. 1,800,000 (600,000 pupils) in 2101 schools. Number of observations for girls: 
approx. 1,800,000 (600,000 pupils) in 2134 schools. Standard error clustered at the school level. **: at least 1% significant; *: at 
least 5% significant; §: at least 10% significant. 
 
  39 
 
Table 7 – Impact of peer quality on KS3 attainments: treatments separately defined by pupils’ gender  
 Within-pupil estimates 
 Percentage of bottom 5% pupils  Percentage of top 5% pupils 
 Counting male  
pupils only 
Counting female 
pupils only  
 Counting male  
pupils only 
Counting female 
pupils only  
Dependent variable is: (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Panel A: Boys only      
KS3 percentiles,  
controlling for KS2 
Effect size 
-0.065 
 (0.049) 
0.405 
-0.090 
 (0.060) 
0.452 
 -0.073 
  (0.039)§ 
 0.600 
-0.034 
 (0.044) 
 0.294 
      
F-Test: coefficients are 
equal (p-value) 0.7685  0.5364 
F-Test: coeffs. jointly 
equal to zero (p-value) 0.0929  0.1121 
      
Panel B: Girls only      
KS3 percentiles,  
controlling for KS2 
Effect size 
-0.068 
 (0.053) 
0.414 
-0.124 
   (0.058)* 
0.755 
 0.037 
(0.042) 
0.286 
0.077 
 (0.043)§ 
0.797 
      
F-Test: coefficients are 
equal (p-value) 0.4980  0.5259 
F-Test: coeffs. jointly 
equal to zero (p-value) 0.0303  0.1168 
      
Note: The table reports regression coefficients and standard errors in round brackets from regressions of the dependent variable on 
treatments. Treatment effects estimated from one single regression including both treatments. The table displays the coefficient on 
treatments based on new peers and computed separately for male and female pupils. All regressions control for the quality of old 
peers computed separately for male and female pupils, and for the average quality of new and old peers. Controls further include 
KS2 percentiles in same- and cross-subject in interaction with subject dummies included, as well as subject dummies. Effect size 
(in italics) refer to the effect of a one standard deviation of the within-pupil distribution of peers as a percentage of one standard 
deviation of the within-pupil distribution of KS3 percentiles. Number of observations: approximately 1,800,000 (600,000 pupils) in 
each panel. Number of schools: 2101 in Panel A; 2134 in Panel B. Standard error clustered at the school level. *: at least 5% 
significant; §: at least 10% significant.  
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Appendix Table 
 
Appendix Table 1 – Within and between variation in pupil test scores and treatment measures 
 Regular students Sample including boys only Sample including girls only 
Variable: Mean Overall 
Std.dev. 
Between 
Std.dev. 
Within 
Std.dev. 
Mean Overall 
Std.dev. 
Between 
Std.dev. 
Within 
Std.dev. 
Mean Overall 
Std.dev. 
Between 
Std.dev. 
Within 
Std.dev. 
             
KS2 percentiles 49.19 24.31 21.15 11.98 48.71 24.38 21.10 12.21 49.66 24.22 21.19 11.73 
KS3 percentiles 49.10 25.61 22.99 11.29 48.02 25.76 23.02 11.56 50.19 25.42 22.92 11.01 
             
Average peer 
achievement at KS2 
49.80 8.38 7.96 2.61 49.79 8.38 7.97 2.58 49.82 8.377 7.95 2.63 
Percentage, bottom 5% 3.79 2.78 2.62 0.94 3.79 2.80 2.64 0.93 3.79 2.77 2.61 0.94 
Percentage,  top 5% 3.97 2.81 2.49 1.29 3.96 2.79 2.49 1.27 3.98 2.82 2.50 1.32 
             
Note: Number of observations in the sample of regular students: approximately 3,600,000 corresponding to 1,200,000 pupils and 3 subjects. Number of observations in samples of boys and girls only: 
approximately 1,800,000 corresponding to 600,000 pupils and 3 subjects. Peer quality measures refer to new peers only. 
 
 
 
  41 
Figures 
 
Figure 1 – Balancing and treatment effects of bottom 5% peers; by cumulative bands of the within-pupil standard 
deviation of KS2 attainments 
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Treatment effects on KS3 
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Note: The figure plots regression coefficients and 95% confidence intervals (standard errors clustered at the school level) obtained regressing 
pupil KS2 achievements (top panels) and KS3 achievements (bottom panels) on the percentage of bottom 5% new peers. Regressions include: 
pupil fixed-effects; subject and subject-by-gender dummies; fraction of top 5% new peers and average quality of new peers; control for old 
peer quality. Regressions in the bottom panel further include pupil KS2 achievement in same- and cross -subject interacted with subject 
dummies. 23 different regressions were estimated over different cumulative bands of the standard deviation of KS2 attainments across 
subjects; these spanned the interval std.dev.≤3 to std.dev.≤11.5, in steps of 0.5, and then std.dev.≤15; std.dev.≤17.5; std.dev.≤23; std.dev.≤26; 
full sample. 
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Figure 2 – Treatment effects on KS3 percentiles; by different percentile cut-off points for top and bottom peers 
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Note: The figure plots regression coefficients and 95% confidence intervals (standard errors clustered at the school level) obtained regressing 
pupil KS3 achievements on the following treatments: percentage of top 5% new peers; percentage of top 5-to-10% new peers; percentage of top 
10-to15% new peers; percentage of top 15-to-20% new peers; percentage of top 20-to25% new peers; percentage of bottom 5% new peers; 
percentage of bottom 5-to-10% new peers; percentage of bottom 10-to15% new peers; percentage of bottom 15-to-20% new peers; percentage 
of bottom 20-to25% new peers. The regression further includes: pupil fixed-effects; pupil KS2 achievement in same- and cross-subject 
interacted with subject dummies; average new peer quality; controls for old peer quality; subject and subject-by-gender dummies. Treated 
pupils include students with KS2 achievements between 25th and 75th percentile of the cohort-specific distribution of KS2 for every subjects. 
Number of observations: approx. 2,580,000 (860,000 pupils) in 2193 schools. 
 
  
 
